Fred Dretske grounds, or reasons, when the question ‘How does S know?’ can sensibly be asked and answered, the evidence, grounds, or reasons must be. Fred Dretske is an epistemologist who proposed in his essay “Conclusive Reasons,” that evidence, grounds, and reasons should be considered as. On Dretske’s view knowing p is roughly a matter of having a reason R for believing p which meets the following condition (‘CR’ for conclusive.

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The Argument From Nonclosure of Knowledge Modes Dretske arguedthat we should expect K failure because none of the modes of gaining, preserving or extending knowledge are individually closed. Dretske approved Alvin Goldman ‘s development of a causal account of knowledge.

How justified we are in believing that ticket 1 will lose depends on how probable its losing is. Skepticism is explained by the fact that the contextual variation of epistemic standards is easily overlooked.

If no barn were there, R would fail to hold, so I know a barn is there. Thinking seriously about knowledge undermines our knowledge. One response is that cases such as Dretske’s do not count against Jbut rather against the following principle of the transmissibility of evidence: The latter formula expresses a connection between R and P which is strong enough, I submit, to permit us to say that if 2 is true, then R is a conclusive reason for P.

For example, at one point Ernest Sosa discussed the following version of the condition:. If e is evidence for pand p entails qthen e is evidence for q. For example, since not – biv is entailed by hI am in San Antonio, skeptics may argue as follows: If S were to believe pp would be true.

A Reply to Feldman. However, it is entirely possible to be so situated that one’s belief safely indicates its truth even though the requisite condition is not met for something that follows from that belief.


If no red barn were there I would believe neither that there was a barn, nor that there was a red barn, via red-barn percepts.

Suppose I know Mary is tall and I know Mary is left handed. If there were no physical objects, my experiences would be changed dramatically, since I would not exist.

Yet people in ordinary contexts are perfectly correct in claiming that they know all sorts of things. But being limiting does not coincide drehske being elusive.

Perhaps you cannot rule out mule ; but that stops you from knowing not-mule without stopping you from knowing zeb. According to Dretske and Nozick, we can account for the appeal of skepticism and explain where it goes wrong if we accept their view of knowledge and reject K. Indeed, he cited this as a virtue of his conclusive reasons view.

Epistemic Closure

The argument from skepticism: As Dretske acknowledgedit is actually a weak challenge to K since some relevant alternatives accounts are fully consistent with K. Dustin Stokes – – Philosophy Compass 8 7: For example, at one point Ernest Sosa discussed the following version of the condition: If I were, I would justifiably believe that no ticket will win. However, each version of the straight principle is false, since we can know one thing, pbut fail to see that p entails q, conclhsive for some other reason fail to believe q.

Obviously much more is involved. If, while knowing pS believes q because S knows q is equivalent to pthen S knows q. When Does Evidence Suffice for Cconclusive The Closure Principle 2. If, like lottery propositions, lotteryesque propositions are not easily known, they increase the pressure on the closure principle, since they are entailed by a wide range of mundane propositions which become unknowable, given closure.

According to Dretske Anyone who rejects K on the grounds that K sanctions the knowledge of limiting or heavyweight propositions discussed earlier is likely to reject J on similar grounds: This was the end of searching for a priori justifications of true belief In Dretske called for epistemology to be put on an information-science basis.


We may also simplify the analyses.

Fred I. Dretske, Conclusive reasons – PhilPapers

Put another way, the point is that the following reasoning is valid being an instance of strengthening the consequence: The status of this principle is much more controversial. Having accepted the tracking view—as they do when they deny that we know skeptical hypotheses are false—skeptics cannot appeal to the principle of closure, which is false on the tracking theory. Both are true if we analyze indication and information as follows: Nonetheless, they are controversial.

Nelson Goodman – – Harvard University Press. If, while knowing that all things are FS believes a particular thing a is F because S knows it is entailed by the fact that all things are Fthen S knows a is F. Another anticlosure argument is that there are some sorts of propositions we cannot know unless perhaps we take extraordinary measures, yet such propositions are entailed by mundane claims whose truth we do know.

Moore knows he is standing; his knowing that he is standing entails that he is not dreaming; therefore, he knows or rather is in a position to know that he is not dreaming. Renew your membership Member directory.

The second version of the argument from the analysis of knowledge has it that any relevant alternatives view, not just tracking accounts, is in tension with K. An obvious example is any necessary truth:

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