In the philosophy of language, the distinction between concept and object is attributable to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege. Overview[edit]. According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists Frege, G. ” On Concept and Object”, originally published as “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand” in. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. Original: “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand”, in Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie XVI (): –;; In English: “Concept. Download Citation on ResearchGate | Kerry und frege über begriff und gegenstand 1 | After describing the philosophical background of Kerry’s work, an account.

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Peter Geach, Blackwell, Essays in the philosophy of languageRoutledge,pp.

Wittgenstein first visited Frege in Jena inand then at least two more times, in andgegenstaand he was Russell’s student in Cambridge. Edited by Gottfried Gabriel et al.

Causal theory of reference Contrast theory of meaning Contrastivism Conventionalism Cratylism Deconstruction Descriptivist theory of names Direct reference theory Dramatism Expressivism Linguistic determinism Logical atomism Logical positivism Mediated reference theory Nominalism Non-cognitivism Phallogocentrism Quietism Relevance theory Semantic externalism Semantic holism Structuralism Supposition theory Symbiosism Theological noncognitivism Theory of descriptions Verification theory.

The point is even clearer with respect to negated existential statements; “there are no Venus moons” is obviously not about any moon of Venus if the statement is true, there are nonebut denies that something falls under the concept Venus moon. Reprinted in LU and KStr. Barth,pp. No citations to Frege’s letters are compiled.


File:Gottlob Frege, Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand, pdf – Wikimedia Commons

The logical connectives, as well as the quantifiers, are taken to be denoting expressions, having as references the requisite truth functions and higher-order functions, respectively. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. The Reason’s Proper Study: Blackwell GegenstnadP. Appleton-Century-Crofts FurthM.

In the s, however, it began to be recognized that Frege had indeed hit on an exciting fact: No keywords specified fix it. Singular terms, such as proper names and definite descriptions, are linguistically saturated or complete and refer to objects; predicate and functional expressions are incomplete and refer to functions.

It seems fair to say that Frege in particular, through the aforementioned review, as well as the preface to the first volume of Grundgesetze is at least partly responsible for Husserl’s antipsychologistic turn.

His contributions include the development of modern logic in the Begriffsschrift and work in the foundations of mathematics. There are, for instance, no formation rules given for the formulas of the language; functions seem to be identified unx functional expressions; the gegenstandd of the propositional connectives are specified in terms of assertion and denial rather than truth and falsity; and although Frege officially countenances only one inference rule, namely, modus ponenshe tacitly uses an instantiation rule for the universal quantifier as well.

In the introduction to Grundlagen Frege enunciates “three fundamental principles” for his investigations.

Concept and object

Moreover, until Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica 3 vols. The originality and independence of Frege’s work especially from Russell’sas well as his important role as a progenitor of analytic philosophy, was brought to prominence through the writings of Michael Dummett in the s, who gegriff himself heavily influenced by Frege’s methodology and interests.


Die Grundlagen Der Arithmetik: This fact has become known as Frege’s theorem. Jacquette in Jacquette []. A logic-mathematical enquiry into the concept of numberOxford: The one truly new principle was one he called gegenztand Basic Law V: There is a reply in defense of Hilbert by A.

This was a considerable departure from the traditional term logicin which every proposition i.

Concept and object – Wikipedia

Zur Lehre vom Transfinitien. Review of Georg Cantor: In any case Frege proposes an explicit definition of “the number belonging to F ” that in effect amounts to taking this number to be the equivalence class of F under the equivalence relation of equinumerosity which is explained in terms of the existence of a one-one and onto correlation: Felix Meiner ThielC.

Thus “the concept horse is not a concept, whereas the city of Berlin is a city”. In the case of incomplete expressions, such as predicates and functional expressions, the references are of course the corresponding unsaturated concepts and functions.

Felix Meiner; second, expanded edition, This image can also be seen on Gallica: Geach in Geach and Black [] pp. Kienzler Begriff und Gegenstand.